Section 8

Citation: Section 8
Parent Document: Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2017-10-18
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4435296/theodore-hayes-v-philip-harvey/ ↗

Other Sections in This Document (260)

Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
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          The majority notes, correctly, that the text of the
statute does not reference any limitation on the right to remain.
It therefore suggests that there can be no justification for the
rule I (and HUD and other courts) would adopt, which allows
for nonrenewals for good cause. Maj. Op. at 21 n.8. But an
ambiguity regarding the scope of the right to remain does not
mean that a right to remain does not exist. When a statute is
ambiguous, “we are left to resolve that ambiguity.” Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345 (1997). The majority writes
as if any uncertainty in a statutory provision renders that
provision meaningless. Our volumes of decisions interpreting
statutes make obvious that this is not so.