Section 8

Citation: Section 8
Parent Document: Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2017-10-18
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4435296/theodore-hayes-v-philip-harvey/ ↗

Other Sections in This Document (260)

Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
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Yet this is exactly how the majority defines the right to
remain. Under the majority’s interpretation, the “may elect to
remain” language only applies during the lease term, and a
tenant’s ability to stay in their home evaporates the second it is
actually needed, i.e., whenever their lease ends and their
landlord wants them out.             In effect, the majority’s
interpretation of the enhanced voucher statute is no different
than a court taking a black marker to the opening lines of the
statute and to Congress’s 2000 amendment. It operates as a
total excision of statutory text and meaning. Such an
interpretation usurps the very role of Congress that the majority
claims to be upholding. 3