Section 8

Citation: Section 8
Parent Document: Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2017-10-18
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4435296/theodore-hayes-v-philip-harvey/ ↗

Other Sections in This Document (260)

Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
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Full Text

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The majority insists that this paragraph in fact provides
enhanced voucher-holders with only one right, that to an
increased payment standard (and its corollary, the right to
actually use that increased payment). Maj. Op. at 14-15. But
this is at odds with the basic structure and grammar of the
paragraph. The language providing that voucher holders “may
elect to remain,” grants tenants a separate right on top of the
increased payment standard. The “may elect to remain” clause
comes first and stands independently. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(B)
(“[T]he assisted family may elect to remain in the same project
in which the family was residing on the date of the eligibility
event for the project, and if, during any period the family
makes such an election . . . .”). It is not conditioned on what
follows. The payment standard is then separated by the words
“and if.” As such, the rest of the paragraph—the payment
standard—is separate, subordinate, and conditional.