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Section 8

Citation
Section 8
Parent Document
Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Effective Date
2017-10-18
Original Source
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4435296/theodore-hayes-v-philip-harvey/ ↗

Other Sections in This Document (260)

Full Text

1,409 chars 
1
          Although the majority indicates that it is the “HAP
contract and related lease” that “subject” Harvey to the
requirements of Section 8, it provides no support for this
statement. Maj. Op. at 10 n.1. Nothing in Section 8 conditions
its effect—the power of a federal statute—on common law
devices like contracts and leases, although the statute does use
such devices to carry out its scheme. Put differently, Congress
can legislate without authorization from a private contract.
Indeed, other courts have held that the enhanced voucher
statute can impose requirements even on landlords who are not
covered by a HAP contract. See Park Vill. Apartment Tenants
Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Tr., 636 F.3d 1150, 1161-62 (9th
Cir. 2011). Particularly given that the contract and lease terms
are not implicated in this litigation, it is the statute, and only
the statute, which is the source of the obligations at issue. The
majority correctly proceeds with a statutory analysis, but
fundamentally misstates the source of the statute’s power:
Article I of the Constitution, not private agreements.
       2
         The majority begins its analysis with a different
provision, that governing the procedure for opting out of
project-based Section 8 assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(8). I
agree that this provision does not govern the case; indeed, no
one argues that it does. Maj. Op. at 12 (“The parties do not