Section 8
- Citation
- Section 8
- Parent Document
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Jurisdiction
- United States (federal)
- Effective Date
- 2017-10-18
Other Sections in This Document (260)
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
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Full Text
1,213 charsWe further acknowledge that, in the framework of non-binding Skidmore deference that the dissent references, an agency may be entitled to some degree of deference given its “specialized experience,” and given the “value of uniformity.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140-41, 65 S.Ct. 161). Our dissenting colleague suggests that our holding imposes a particularly high “risk of disuniformity” because,, in Park Village, the Ninth Circuit supposedly “ruled in favor of HUD’s interpretation.” Dissenting Op. at 119. The majority does not, however, create any such “disuniformity.” Park Village’s holding was limited to the question before it—involving a midterm eviction for nonpayment—and the majority agrees with the disposition of that limited question. See Park Village, 636 F.3d at 1153 (“Plaintiffs have a statutory right to remain in the complex, and are, accordingly, entitled to an injunction barring Defendants from evicting them solely because they are paying only their statutorily determined portion of each month’s rental payment.”). Cabining the “right to remain” in this instance does not create “disuniformity.”