§ 1487f
- Citation
- § 1487f
- Parent Document
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Jurisdiction
- United States (federal)
- Effective Date
- 2017-10-18
Other Sections in This Document (260)
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
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- § 1437f
- § 1437f
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- § 1437f
- § 1487f
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Full Text
1,090 charsSecond, to hold that § 1437f(t)(l)(C) is exhaustive of the specific ways in which an assisted family may lose eligibility for enhanced voucher' assistance would subject property owners to a perpetual lease. This would be a significant departure from the ordinary voucher provision which does not, in any way, limit property owners’ nonre-newal rights.4 See § 1437f(o)(7)(C). It would also make opt-out from project-based programs, under which property-owners do have termination rights, see § 1437f(d)(l)(B), far less attractive. Such a result would likely discourage property owner participation in the first, place, in turn frustrating realization of section 8’s explicit purpose.5 Had Congress intended to require property owners to continually renew enhanced-voucher tenancies, we are confident it would have said so clearly. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) (explaining that Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes” by “alter[ing] the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions”).