Section 8

Citation: Section 8
Parent Document: Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2017-10-18
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4435296/theodore-hayes-v-philip-harvey/ ↗

Other Sections in This Document (260)

Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
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Contrary to the majority’s accusation, I do not ignore the opt-out provision. We do not even disagree about the provision’s importance. Section 1437f(c)(8) triggers the provision of an enhanced voucher, which we all agree has already occurred. It does not govern what protections an enhanced voucher provides once the opt-out is complete—again, an issue on which we agree. Maj. Op. at 104 ("it is silent on a property owner’s termination rights following that notice period”). Since the majority never argues that § 1437f(c)(8) changes the interpretation of the enhanced voucher statute, rather than triggering its applicability, nothing is being read out of context. I merely proceed directly to the area of our disagreement.