§ 1437f
- Citation
- § 1437f
- Parent Document
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Jurisdiction
- United States (federal)
- Effective Date
- 2017-10-18
Other Sections in This Document (260)
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
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Full Text
889 charsWe recognize that a “statute should be construed to give effect to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant,” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009), that § 1437f(c)(8)(A) already providés a right to remain during the year following a property owner’s notice of opt-out from a project-based program, and that § 524(d) of the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-65, tit. V, subtit. A, 111 Stat. 1344, 1408-09 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f note), already obligates HUD to provide enhanced vouchers to eligible families. Still, for the reasons that follow, we do not believe that declining to require property owners to continuously renew enhanced-voucher tenancies renders the “may elect” language superfluous or otherwise meaningless.