Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf

Citation: Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/897239.pdf ↗

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Under Filo Foods's reading, the two statutes would be inconsistent
with one another. RCW 46.46.120 mandates that the laws in any given
location most favorable to the employee shall be in f-ull force and effect.
That provision would be meaningless if the Port of Seattle could trump
such laws in airports it controls. RCW 49.46.120 does not carve out an
exception for airports, and RCW 14.08.330 does not contain any language
indicating that the Port of Seattle's jurisdiction and control over the airport
includes the power to trump local minimum wage laws. As state above,

-9-
 Fila LLC,
     (Stephens,
 J. Dissent)
  
Foods, et al. v. City of SeaTac, et al., 89723-9

that provision precludes the city of SeaTac only from interfering with the
operations of an airport. The ordinance does not do so.

Majority at 18-19. This line of reasoning takes down an argument no one is

making. No one believes the Port of Seattle can "trump" the most employee-

friendly applicable law.

The Minimum Wage Act provides that the most employee-friendly

"applicable . .. local law" governs. RCW 49.46.120 (emphasis added). It does

not, as the majority believes, "set[] the minimum wage in any given location at the

most favorable level to the employee whether by federal, state, or local law."

Majority at 18 (emphasis added). Nor is the majority justified in its assumption

that the relevant "given location" includes the Seattle-Tacoma International

Airport. Instead, the Minimum Wage Act expressly leaves the question of an

ordinance's applicability for other cases. And this case asks whether Proposition 1

applies at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport in light of RCW 14.08.330's