Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf

Citation: Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/897239.pdf ↗

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Our interpretation is supported by our case law indicating that the purpose of

the statutory scheme is to preclude local municipalities "from interfering with respect

to the operation of the Seattle-Tacoma airport." King County v. Port of Seattle, 37

Wn.2d 338, 348,223 P.2d 834 (1950) (addressing whether local municipalities can

impose license fees). In that case, we considered a separate-but related-issue:

whether King County could impose a licensing fee on taxicabs operating at the

Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. We looked to the statute's specific limitation

regarding the ability of local municipalities to impose license fees and held that King

County could not impose a fee because the statute provides that "'no other

municipality in which such airport or air navigation facility [is located] shall have any

police jurisdiction of the same or any authority to charge or exact any license fees.'"

Id. at 346-47 (alteration in original) (quoting REM. REV. STAT. § 2722-44 (Supp.

1945) (codified as amended at RCW 14.08.330)). We explained that "[t]he effect of

this section, when read in the light of the entire revised airports act, is merely to

preclude [King County]from interfering with respect to the operation of the Seattle-

Tacoma airport and forbids [King County from] exacting any license fees." Id. at 348

(emphasis added).

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Fila Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac
89723-9

While that case was focused on the more specific limitation on license fees, this

language represents a commonsense interpretation of the legislature's intent,

particularly its grant of jurisdiction. Looking at the statutory scheme overall, we