Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf

Citation: Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/897239.pdf ↗

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SeaTac) "may be responsible for the administration and enforcement of the
uniform fire code ... on that portion of any airport ... located with its
jurisdictional boundaries," so long as it does this "by agreement with the
municipality operating and controlling the airport," (the Port of Seattle). !d. Thus,
a fire code is the single circumstance in which the city of SeaTac can enforce its

laws within the airport.
This exception disproves the majority's conclusion that "airport" in RCW
14.08.330 means only "airport operations or the subject of aeronautics," majority
at 16. If the legislature intended the operating municipality's exclusive jurisdiction
to be over only that narrow functional concept, why would the legislature specify
an exception from the operating municipality's exclusive jurisdiction to allow the
municipality in which the airport sits to enforce a fire code at the airport? Under
the majority's view of the statute, the fire-code exception is simply unneeded
because the city of SeaTac can already enforce a fire code at Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport because that does not concern "airport operations or the
subjection of aeronautics," id.
The fire-code exception creates a second puzzle under the majority's test.
The exception provides that the city in which the airport is located (the city of
SeaTac) may enforce a fire code within the airport only if the city does so "by
agreement with the municipality operating and controlling the airport" (the Port of
Seattle). RCW 14.08.330. As the majority notes, this exception was crafted by
legislative amendment in response to concerns raised by the Seattle city attorney.