Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf

Citation: Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/897239.pdf ↗

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"distinguishes between entities that serve a principally interstate clientele and those

that primarily serve an intrastate market by singling out those businesses that

principally serve the Airport and air travelers." Filo Foods's Opening Br. at 52-53.

This argument misunderstands the nature of facial discrimination. A facially

discriminatory law textually identifies out-of-state persons or entities and grants them

unfavorable treatment. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of

Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 568 & n.2, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 137 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1997). That

is not what Proposition 1 does. Proposition 1 does not distinguish between persons

and entities located in Washington State and those located outside Washington State.

The law accordingly does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce.

Instead, Proposition 1 must be analyzed under the Pike test because it is a

facially nondiscriminatory law that may have an incidental effect on interstate

40
  FifoFoods,
LLC
 v.City
       
of SeaTac
89723-9

commerce. But Filo Foods does not argue, much less demonstrate, that the

undisputed facts establish as a matter of law that "'the burden imposed on [interstate]

commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."' United

Haulers Ass 'n, 550 U.S. at 346 (alteration in original) (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142).

Accordingly, under the Pike test, we hold that Filo Foods has not established that

Proposition 1 violates the dormant commerce clause.

CONCLUSION

We largely affirm the trial court, but we reverse on two issues. We hold that

under state law, Proposition 1 can be enforced at the Seattle-Tacoma International