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Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf

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Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf
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Washington (state)
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this case. The majority simply asserts and concludes, "Proposition 1 has nothing to
do with airport operations or the subject of aeronautics." Majority at 16. Yet,

-7-
 Fifo LLC,
Foods,   
et al. 
v. City of SeaTac,  (Stephens,
et al., 89723-9  J. Dissent)
  

Proposition 1's text specifically regulates the performance of quintessential airport
activities that the Port of Seattle contracts for, regulates, and licenses, including

"aircraft interior cleaning; aircraft carpet cleaning; aircraft washing and cleaning;
aviation ground support equipment washing and cleaning; aircraft water or
lavatory services; [and] aircraft fueling." SEATAC MUNICIPAL CODE

7.45.010(M)(1)(a); see also Br. of Resp't Port of Seattle at 27-32 (describing the

Port of Seattle's regulation of these and other activities that Proposition 1 attempts

to regulate). The majority's summary conclusion that "Proposition 1 has nothing

to do with airport operations or the subject of aeronautics," majority at 16, makes

the majority's new test all the more troubling.

The legislature did not intend to foster a cottage industry of litigation over

airport operations, where the courts arrive at case-by-case conclusory
determinations under an imprecise test. It chose to draw a clear line. It enacted a

statute that gives exclusive jurisdiction and control to the operating municipality.

RCW 14.08.330. And it specifically said that "[n]o other municipality in which
the airport ... is located shall have any police jurisdiction of the [airport]." Jd.

The legislature understood that because airports are unique, complex operations,

they should be governed by one and only one local government-the one that