Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf

Citation: Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/897239.pdf ↗

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Proposition 1 applies at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport because the
 Fila LLC,
Foods,   
et al. 
v. City of SeaTac,  (Stephens,
et al., 89723-9  J. Dissent)
  

plaintiffs did not make a "factual showing that Proposition 1 would interfere with
airport operations." Majority at 19. This creates an unworkable rule requiring

courts to adjudicate the jurisdictional boundary between governmental entities,
determining in this case whether the city of SeaTac's ordinances "interfere" with
the undefined concept of "airport operations." !d. The legislature decisively
rejected such an uncertain case-by-case approach to airport regulation. I would
hold that Proposition 1 may not be enforced at the Seattle-Tacoma International
Airport. To this extent, I respectfully dissent.
I. The Revised Airports Act, RCW 14.08.330

A. RCW 14.08.330 Provides That Proposition 1 Cannot Be Applied at the
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport

As we emphasize in every case of statutory interpretation, "[i]f the statute's
meaning is plain, we give effect to that meaning as the expression of the
legislature's intent." Majority at 10 (citing State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600,
115 P.3d 281 (2005) ). Only if "the statutory language is susceptible to more than
one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we may 'resort to extrinsic aids,
such as legislative history,' to resolve the ambiguity." !d. (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wn.2d 416, 423, 103 P.3d 1230
(2005)).