Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf

Citation: Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
Source verification: official_capture_completeness_unverified
Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/897239.pdf ↗

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the majority sees things, it is only as to the second part that the Port of Seattle has

exclusive jurisdiction and control. !d. at 14-15. After announcing this new

interpretation, the majority concludes, "Proposition 1 has nothing to do with airport

operations or the subject of aeronautics," so the city of SeaTac has not invaded the

Port of Seattle's exclusive jurisdiction and control. !d. at 16. I disagree with the

majority's interpretation and application.

The majority's distinction, between the airport as a geographic area and as a

set of functional activities ("airport operations or the subject of aeronautics," id.),

is nowhere to be found in the statute. The subject of the statute is simply "[e]very

airport." RCW 14.08.330. The statute does not slice and dice an "airport" to

reveal some sort of "core airport function" judicial test. Instead the statute

concerns, as its language says it does, the airport.

The statute's structure confirms this. The statute follows a general

rule/exception structure. Its general rule is that the municipality controlling and

operating the airport (the Port of Seattle) shall have exclusive jurisdiction and

control over the airport, and that no other municipality in which the airport is

located (the city of SeaTac) shall have any police jurisdiction of the airport. RCW

14.08.330. The statute then has one exception to that rule. The exception provides

"However, ... a municipality in which an airport ... is located" (the city of

-5-
 Filo LLC,
Foods,  
et al. 
v. City of SeaTac,  (Stephens,
et al., 89723-9  J. Dissent)