Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf

Citation: Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/897239.pdf ↗

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Nor is the statute's provision that denies SeaTac authority to charge or exact any
license fees or occupation taxes at the airport superfluous. As is common in legislation,
RCW 14.08.330 includes a general provision followed by specific examples that are
included out of an abundance of caution. The specific prohibition on license fees and
occupation taxes clarifies the general language on exclusive jurisdiction; it is not
superfluous. E.g., HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 431 (2d ed. 1911) ("[A] proviso ... may be introduced
from excessive caution, and designed to prevent a possible misinterpretation of the
statute .... ").
3 The majority relies on dicta from King County v. Port of Seattle, 37 Wn.2d 338,
348, 223 P.2d 834 (1950), stated in the context of our conclusion that RCW 14.08.330
does not violate the constitutional provision that '"[t]here shall be no territory stricken
from any county."' (Quoting WASH. CONST. art. XI,§ 3.) Separate from determining the
statute's constitutionality, when we applied RCW 14.08.330, we held RCW 14.08.330
precludes King County from enforcing taxi licensing fees at Seattle-Tacoma International
Airport. !d. at 346-47. The case's holding provides no support to authorize a local
regulation at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport.

-4-
Fifo LLC,
Foods,
et al.
v. City of SeaTac, (Stephens,
et al., 89723-9 J. Dissent)

place-the geographic area in which the Port of Seattle owns title to the land and

has the power to regulate. The second part is a set of activities-"airport

operations and the subject of aeronautics." Majority at 14 (emphasis omitted). As