Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf

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use of any properties under [the municipality's] control" and "to fix by ordinance or

resolution ... penalties for the violation of the rules, regulations, and ordinances, and

enforce those penalties in the same manner in which penalties prescribed by other

rules, regulations, and ordinances of the municipality are enforced." RCW

14.08.120(2).

The Port of Seattle asks us to interpret this statute, in combination with RCW

14.08.330' s grant of "exclusive jurisdiction," as a law that strips the city of SeaTac of

all police power-that is, all of its normal authority to regulate in the interests of

public health and safety-at the airport. But RCW 14.08.120(2) contemplates a

municipality using its normal rule-making authority and procedures to enact and

enforce airport-specific rules, and the Port of Seattle's normal authority does not

include the exercise of general police powers. Outside the airport context, a port

district's rule-making authority is subordinate to the authority of the municipality

within which it is situated. RCW 53.08.220(1). While any port district "may

formulate all needful regulations for the use ... of any properties or facilities owned

or operated by it," those regulations "must conform to and be consistent with the

ordinances of the city or town" in which the district is located. !d.

This statutory scheme reflects a fundamental difference between the powers of

a special purpose district, like the Port of Seattle, and those of a city, town, or county.

Fila Foods, LLC v. City ofSeaTac
89723-9

To interpret RCW 14.08.120 and .330 in the manner the Port of Seattle suggests, we