Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf

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conclude that the legislature intended to give the Port of Seattle exclusive jurisdiction

over the operation of the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport: specifically "the

construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipment, operation, and

regulation" of the airport. RCW 14.08.120(1). Here, Proposition 1 has nothing to do

with airport operations or the subject of aeronautics. In addition, the Port of Seattle

does not show that Proposition 1 would interfere with airport operations. As a result,

we conclude that Proposition 1 can be enforced at the Seattle-Tacoma International

Airport without violating RCW 14.08.330.

The dissent asserts that the provision ofRCW 14.08.330 related to the

administration and enforcement of local fire codes "disproves" our interpretation of

the statute. Dissent at 6. It asserts that "[i]fthe legislature intended the operating

municipality's exclusive jurisdiction to be over only [airport operations], why would

the legislature specify an exception from the operating municipality's exclusive

jurisdiction to allow the municipality in which the airport sits to enforce afire code at

the airport?" !d. at 6-7. The legislative history of the fire code amendment answers

the dissent's question. The house committee in support of the bill testified, "Seattle

has been enforcing its uniform fire code on the portion of the King County airport

Fila Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac
89723-9

located within its boundaries, but their attorney feels they may not have this authority .

. . . This bill clarifies an ambiguity in current law." H.B. REPORT ON H.B. 139, 49th

Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1985). That language shows that the legislature added the