Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf

Citation: Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/897239.pdf ↗

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Filo Foods next argues that under the Garmon doctrine, the NLRA preempts

Proposition 1's antiretaliation provision, SeaTac Municipal Code 7.45.090. That

provision states:

A. It shall be a violation for a hospitality employer or transportation
employer or any other person to interfere with, restrain, or deny the
exercise of, or the attempt to exercise, any right protected under this
chapter.

B. It shall be a violation for a hospitality employer or transportation
employer to take adverse action or to discriminate against a covered
worker because the covered worker has exercised in good faith the rights
protected under this chapter.

SEATAC MUNICIPAL CODE 7.45.090. The trial court determined the NLRA preempts

these provisions insofar as they create a '"supplemental sanction for violations of the

NLRA."' Clerk's Papers at 1961. The court reasoned that "[t]hese provisions of the

Ordinance directly infringe on the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction under §8 of the

NLRA, which already makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer 'to interfere

Filo Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac
89723-9

with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in' §7." Id.

(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l); NLRA § 8(a)(1)). We reverse in this respect.

The NLRA does indeed preempt state or local laws that create supplemental

sanctions for violations of the NLRA. "[T]he Garmon rule prevents States ... from

providing their own regulatory or judicial remedies for conduct prohibited or arguably

prohibited by the Act." Gould Inc., 475 U.S. at 286. For example, in Gould Inc., the

United States Supreme Court held that a Wisconsin statute that prohibited businesses