Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf

Citation: Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 897239.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/897239.pdf ↗

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Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo.

State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P .3d 281 (2005). When interpreting

statutes, our goal is to effectuate the legislature's intent. Id. If the statute's meaning

is plain, we give effect to that meaning as the expression of the legislature's intent.

!d. Plain meaning is determined from the statute as a whole; we consider the ordinary

meaning of the language used in the context of the entire statute, related statutory

provisions, and the statutory scheme from which the language appears. Id. If the

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Fila Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac
89723-9

statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is

ambiguous, and we may "'resort to extrinsic aids, such as legislative history,"' to

resolve the ambiguity. Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wn.2d 416, 423, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005)

(quoting Biggs v. Vail, 119 Wn.2d 129, 134, 830 P.2d 350 (1992)).

At issue in this case is whether Proposition 1 directly and irreconcilably

conflicts with RCW 14.08.330, the statute that gives special purpose districts (such as

the Port of Seattle) jurisdiction over airports. The statute provides: