Nursing, 222 AD2d 233 [1st Dept 1995], app wdn 241 AD2d 983 [1997] and
Foley v Mobil Chemical Co., 214 AD2d 1003, 1005 [4th Dept 1995], rearg den,
n.o.r., 1995 WL 413878 [1995]). Plaintiff primarily cites to David's "wholly
inappropriate" sexual harassment and salacious taste in decorating his apartment. Given
the foregoing examples, these allegations are not sufficiently [*16]outrageous to state a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff's contention that David's conduct was so
outrageous that she could not bare to return to work, or even talk to Jeffrey about it is
immaterial here. With respect to this cause of action, unlike the sexual harassment
claims, the emphasis is not on plaintiff's subjective reactions to the offensive conduct,
but on how outrageous the conduct is in objective terms. "To survive a motion to
dismiss, a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress must allege
conduct so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community" (Foley v Mobil Chemical, supra, 214 AD2d at 1005).
Nor has plaintiff succeeded in asserting a viable claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. To maintain a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress in the context of a sexual harassment suit, the plaintiff must show that the
harasser's conduct was such that it caused her to fear for her physical safety (Persaud
v S. Axelrod Company, n.o.r., 1996 WL 11197 [SDNY 1996], citing Cucchi v
New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 818 F Supp 647, 656 [SDNY 1993]).
There are no allegations of physical threats to plaintiff to support this claim.
Remaining Claims