209 AD2d 834 [3d Dept 1994] ["an employer's calculated inaction ... may readily
indicate condonation"]).
(iii). Similarly, plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of whatever corrective
opportunities Bulletproof could have offered her if it had been given the chance. Plaintiff
did not even resign, she just left work one day and did not return the next, and when
Jeffrey called her multiple times to find out what happened, she did not return his calls
(see Jeffrey's EBT; see also plaintiff's EBT pp 49-51). Under these circumstances,
plaintiff cannot state a claim against Bulletproof even assuming arguendo that
David was her supervisor (see ibid.; see also Torres v Pisano, 116 F3d
625 [2d Cir 1997], cert den 522 US 997 [1997] [An employer cannot be held liable for
failure to remedy a claim of hostile work environment where the employee has asked the
employer to not act and keep the matter confidential]).
(B). Perfect World
Plaintiff is staunch in her belief that David was her supervisor despite the evidence
— or lack thereof. Plaintiff's theory of liability against Perfect World is that since
she did work for David, and David owned Perfect World and had nothing to do with
Bulletproof (see Jeffrey's EBT, pp 25-26), she must have done that work for Perfect
World, which is thus her joint [*10]employer' along with
Bulletproof. According to plaintiff, since David was her supervisor, Perfect World is also
vicariously liable for David's harassment and David is personally liable to plaintiff for his
discriminatory conduct by virtue of his ownership interest in Perfect World.
For purposes of defendants' summary judgment motion with respect to this cause of
action, plaintiff must be deemed to be Perfect World's employee. Given the standards