Human Rights Law only if they have an "ownership interest or any power to do more
than carry out personnel decisions made by others" (Patrowich v Chemical Bank,
63 NY2d 541, 542 [1984]). However, the court did not specify under which subsection
of Executive Law § 296 that individual would be liable (id.; Petrosky v
New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, 72 F Supp 2d 39, 64-65 [NDNY
1999]). Subsequent courts have interpreted Patrowich broadly and allowed
individuals to be sued for discrimination (see Kaiser v Raoul's Restaurant
Corporation, 72 AD3d 539 [1st Dept 2010]).
Jeffrey has an ownership interest in Bulletproof, plaintiff's primary employer, but
since he is not the alleged harasser and the discrimination claim against Bulletproof
cannot be sustained, he cannot be held individually liable for sexual harassment.
There is no evidence that David, the alleged harasser, has either an ownership
interest in Bulletproof, which paid plaintiff's salary, or the power to do anything in that
company; he does, however, have an ownership interest in Perfect World. The theory is
that if an individual has an ownership interest in the corporate employer, managerial
responsibilities and the authority to make personnel decisions including hiring and firing,
he is liable as an employer even though he is an individual rather than a corporate entity
(see Gallegos v Elite Model Management Corp., 28 [*11]AD3d 50, 60 [1st Dept 2005]).
II. City law
In the fourth cause of action plaintiff alleges that defendants violated Section
8-107[1](a) of the City's Administrative Code [FN2] "by actually and constructively
discharging, creating and maintaining discriminatory working conditions, and otherwise
discriminating against [her] because of her gender and sexual harassment" (¶ 56).