abetted the discrimination, she has not alleged that he (or Bulletproof or Perfect World)
wilfully participated in David's sexual harassment of her. The only [*15]active participant in the harassment and discrimination
alleged by plaintiff is David, who cannot be held liable. "Where no violation of the
Human Rights Law by another party has been established, ... an individual employee
cannot be held liable for aiding or abetting such a violation. In other words ... individuals
cannot be held liable under Executive Law § 296(6) for aiding and abetting their
own violations of the Human Rights Law" (Strauss v New York State Dept. of
Education, supra, 26 AD3d at 73, citations omitted). A sexual harasser
"cannot be liable for aiding or abetting his own conduct" (Jordan v Cayuga
County, supra, 2004 WL 437459 at *5, citations omitted).
In view of the foregoing, the court finds that plaintiff's third and sixth causes of
action cannot be sustained against any of the defendants.
Infliction of Emotional
Distress
The ninth cause of action alleges that defendants' "extreme and outrageous conduct"
inflicted "severe emotional distress" on plaintiff (¶¶ 71-74). Unlike plaintiff's
other causes of action, which are all statutory, this claim is strictly a tort.
Although in plaintiff's complaint this cause of action is asserted against all
defendants, in her memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for summary
judgment she posits that the claims for infliction of emotional distress are asserted only
against David. Hence, the court will deem this cause of action abandoned as against all
defendants other than David.
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress "has four elements: (i) extreme