Rights, 221 AD2d 44, 49-50 [4th Dept 1996], rearg den, n.o.r., 647 NYS2d 652 [4th
Dept 1996], lv den 89 NY2d 809 [1997]). "A hostile work environment exists when the
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, ... that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment"
(Tomka v Seiler Corporation, 66 F3d 1295, 1304 [2d Cir 1995], citations
omitted). The standards for liability are different under each of these theories, and a
further distinction is made depending on whether the alleged harasser was a supervisor or
a co-employee of the plaintiff. "Under the quid pro quo sexual harassment theory
corporate defendants are held strictly liable for the sexually harassing conduct of their
supervisors whereas under the hostile environment' sexual harassment theory corporate
defendants are not automatically liable for a supervisor's harassing conduct" (Bridges
v Eastman Kodak Company, 822 F Supp 1020, 1024, n 3 [SDNY 1993], citing
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 70-71 [1986] and Carrero
v New York City Housing Authority, 890 F2d 569, 578-579 [2d Cir 1989]).
In the case at bar, plaintiff has not specified which theory she is relying on; indeed,
she appears to be proceeding under both. Nonetheless, looking at the facts in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, the court finds that there are "not sufficient allegations to
sustain a claim against [her employer] under a quid pro quo harassment theory,
which requires evidence that a plaintiff's reaction to unwelcome sexual conduct be used
as the basis for decisions affecting her compensation or terms of employment"
(Espaillat v Breli Originals, Inc., 227 AD2d 266, 268 [1st Dept 1996]). Plaintiff