Defendants argue that since plaintiff admitted that she left Bulletproof voluntarily
and testified that she made no complaints about the harassment, she cannot sustain these
claims.
Under the liberal standards imposed by the city Council, a claim of sexual
harassment under the city's Human Rights Law "lies when it is proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that ... the plaintiff has been treated less well than other
employees because of her gender,'" a determination which "is ordinarily one for the trier
of fact" to make (Short v Deutsche Bank Securities, supra, 79 AD3d at 505-506,
citing Williams v NYCHA, supra, 61 AD3d 62). The only
proviso is that the allegedly harassing conduct must be "[some]thing more than
non-actionable petty slights and minor inconveniences" (id. at 506). A few
comments "allegedly made within one week of the start of plaintiff's work suffice to
show sexual harassment" (Santos v Brookdale Hospital Medical Center,
supra, 29 Misc 3d 1207(A) at *2).
As one would expect, defendants' summary judgment burden with respect to this
claim is more onerous than under the state law. As discussed above, plaintiff's obligation
to make out a prima facie case is not just minimal but virtually irrelevant.
Whether or not a prima facie case can be made, a moving defendant must show
"that, based on the evidence before the court and drawing all reasonable inferences in
plaintiff's favor, no jury could find defendant liable under any of the evidentiary routes
— McDonnell Douglas, mixed motive, direct' evidence, or some
combination thereof" (Bennett v Health Management Systems, Inc.,
supra, 92 AD3d at 38-40, 45). This is a particularly difficult burden to meet since
Admin Code § 8-107[1](a) is to be construed more broadly and as more remedial