than corollary federal or state laws, and does not require the alleged sexual harassment to
be "severe or pervasive" to be actionable (Williams v NYCHA, supra, 61 AD3d
62, 73-74, citing Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson, supra, 477 US at 67
and Admin Code § 8-130). More important in this case, the Faragher-Ellerth
defense discussed above which relieves Bulletproof of liability pursuant to Executive
Law § 296, is not available as a defense to claims brought under Admin Code
§ 8-107(1)[a] (Zakrzewska v The New School, supra, 14 NY3d
469). To avoid liability under § 8-107[1](a), defendants must "prove that
the conduct complained of consists of nothing more than what a reasonable victim of
discrimination [*12]would consider petty slights and
trivial inconveniences" (Williams v NYCHA, supra, 61 AD3d at 80). They have
not done so.
Furthermore, with respect to Perfect World, this claim cannot be summarily
dismissed because plaintiff's sexual harassment claim against it under state law is being
sustained herein (see Williams, supra, at 66-67).
Since "individual defendants may also be held liable under the City [Human Rights
Law]" (McRedmond v Sutton
Place Restaurant and Bar, Inc., 95 AD3d 671, 673 [1st Dept 2012]), this claim
will also withstand summary judgment against the Brooks brothers.
Retaliation
Plaintiff asserts claims of retaliation under both state and city
human rights laws.
As with plaintiff's fourth cause of action, defendants argue that the claims are not
tenable because plaintiff admitted at her deposition that she was not fired but rather left
voluntarily and that she made no complaints about the alleged discrimination.
I. State law
The second cause of action alleges that defendants violated Executive Law §