retaliation claim under either the state or city law because she cannot show that she
suffered an adverse employment action.
A plaintiff need not suffer a change of title, a decline in income, or a reduction of
benefits, in order to establish an adverse job action. What is required is a materially
adverse change' in the terms and conditions of employment.... To be "materially
adverse," a change in working conditions must be more than a mere inconvenience or an
alteration of job responsibilities" (Curran v All Waste Systems, Inc., 213 F3d 625
[2d Cir 2000] [table; text at [*13]2000 WL 639999, *3],
citing Galabya v New York City Board of Education, 202 F3d 636, 640 [2d Cir
2000]). As discussed above, plaintiff cannot establish that she was the victim of a
materially adverse employment action.
The only retaliatory act alleged in the complaint is that on April 15, 2009 (plaintiff's
last day of work) David "told plaintiff to do all the accounting work that day" (complaint,
¶ 38). This is not enough to impose liability on David or any of the other
defendants. A "one-time assignment to perform a task arguably within plaintiff's duties
did not constitute retaliation" (Williams v NYCHA, supra, 61 AD3d at
65).
The anti-retaliation sections of both the state and city statutes (respectively,
Executive Law § 296[7] and Admin Code § 8—107[7]) provide for
individual liability (Fletcher v.
Dakota, Inc., 99 AD3d 43 [1st Dept 2012]). However, plaintiff's evidence is
insufficient to state a retaliation claim against either Jeffrey or David.
II. City law
The fifth cause of action alleges that each defendant violated Admin Code §
8-107[1](e)[FN3]
"by discriminating against the plaintiff because of plaintiff's opposition to the unlawful