§ 296(6) by aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling and coercing the discriminatory
conduct" (complaint, ¶ 53). In the sixth cause of action plaintiff alleges that each
defendant violated Admin Code § 8-107(6) "by aiding, abetting, inciting,
compelling and coercing the above discriminatory, unlawful and retaliatory conduct"
(¶ 63).
Defendants argue that although discovery is substantially complete, no evidence was
adduced that anyone aided or abetted David's alleged discriminatory conduct. According
to defendants, this, combined with plaintiff's deposition testimony that she does not know
whether Jeffrey or any of the corporate defendants was aware of David's conduct or
facilitated it in any way, make it impossible for plaintiff to state viable claims pursuant to
these causes of action.
Section 296(6) includes "persons" in the list of who may be held liable for aiding and
abetting discrimination. Combining this with Petrowich v Chemical Bank,
supra, the Second Department has held that "[t]he Legislature and the Court of
Appeals have determined that only employers and employee-owners or those with
specified authority are subject to employment discrimination suits under the Human
Rights Law" (Trovato v Air Express International, 238 AD2d 333, 334 [2d Dept
1997]). That principle does not apply in this Department. "It is now settled precedent in
this Department that an individual may be held liable under Executive Law §
296(6), (7) for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct" (D'Amico v Commodities
Exchange Inc., 235 AD2d 313, 315 [1st Dept 1997]), and an individual who
participates in the discriminatory conduct may be held liable for aiding discriminatory
conduct even without any ownership interest (see Steadman v Sinclair, 223