§ 504B

Citation: § 504B
Parent Document: Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)
Jurisdiction: Minnesota (state)
Effective Date: 2016-08-31
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4252990/mary-cocchiarella-v-donald-driggs/ ↗

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        The dissent attempts to minimize its physical possession theory by alleging physical
possession of the keys is sufficient. The dissent’s theory is unreasonable and unsupported
by law. When a tenant has the legal right of occupancy, there is no reason why she must
present physical evidence such as possession of the keys or placement of items within the
premises to exercise her legal rights, nor do such items establish the existence of her legal
rights. For example, if a landlord unlawfully “locks out” a resident by throwing her things
away and changing the locks on the door, the tenant would no longer be able to show
evidence of a key or items in her home, and would not qualify as a “residential tenant”
under the dissent’s interpretation of the statute. Further, if a landlord accepts money for
rent but refuses the tenant the key well after the effective date of the lease, the tenant would
not qualify as a “residential tenant” under the dissent’s interpretation. Conversely, under
the dissent’s theory, a tenant need only show a key that purportedly opens the door to the
premises in question in order to qualify as a “residential tenant.”
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chapter 504B. For example, a consequence of the interpretation proposed by Driggs and

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