law. Circumstances were present which warranted restoration of the respondent to his apartment.
In Parkchester Apartments Co. V. St Clair Scott, 271 AD2d 273, the Appellate Division
held that the tenant deserved restoration even after the warrant of eviction had executed in light
of many factors inuring to tenant's benefit. The Court's power to restore a tenant to possession
after an eviction far exceeds the narrow grounds of CPLR §5015 (See also: Woodson
v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62). In the Matter of Dayton Towers Corp. v. Gethers, 24 AD3d 663, the
Appellate Division, Second Department reversed the Appellate Term and reinstated the lower
court's decision which denied restoration. In that case the Appellate Division found ruled that the
Appellate Term improvidently exercised its discretion in restoring the respondent to possession.
No factors recited in the Appellate Division decision are present here. Moreover, respondent has
voluntarily taken steps to enroll in a financial management program to obviate another
nonpayment proceeding.
In Ocean Realty v. Mitchell, NYLJ, May 22, 1995, p. 30, col. 1, and Theresa 157
Corp. v. Mitchell, NYLJ, July 12, 1994 (App. Term 2nd and 11th Jud. Dists.), the Appellate
Term demonstrated its willingness to depart from the strict confines of CPLR 5015 by exercising
its discretionary power to restore a tenant after an eviction for good cause, ruling the tenant's
default had been de minimis, inadvertent and promptly cured (See also: 102-111 Eighth
Avenue Assoc. v. Oyola, 299 AD2d 296).
In the instant proceeding, the error committed by DSS was addressed and cured promptly,
Aston-Jones Mgt. v. Brown, 2005 Slip O; 51891[U]).). In an unpublished Appellate