Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)

Citation: Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)
Parent Document: Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)
Jurisdiction: Minnesota (state)
Effective Date: 2016-08-31
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4252990/mary-cocchiarella-v-donald-driggs/ ↗

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. The dissent attempts to minimize- its physical possession theory by alleging physical possession of the keys is sufficient. The dissent's theory is unreasonable and unsupported by law. When a tenant has the legal right of occupancy, there is no reason why she must present physical evidence such as possession of the keys or placement of items within the premises to exercise her legal rights, nor do such items establish the existence of her legal rights. For example, if a landlord unlawfully "locks out” a resident by throwing her things away and changing the locks on the door, the tenant would no longer be able to show evidence of a key; dr items in her home, and would not qualify ás a "residential tenant” under the dissent’s interpretation of the statute. Further, if a landlord accepts money for rent but refuses the tenant the key well after the effective -date of the lease, the tenant would not qualify as a "residential tenant” under the dissent’s interpretation. Conversely, under the dissent’s theory, a tenant need only show a key that purportedly opens the door to the premises in question in order to qualify as a "residential tenant.”

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