Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)

Citation: Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)
Parent Document: Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)
Jurisdiction: Minnesota (state)
Effective Date: 2016-08-31
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4252990/mary-cocchiarella-v-donald-driggs/ ↗

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The object of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Legislature. Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn.2012) (citing Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2014)). In accordance "with our canons of interpretation, we construe technical words and phrases “according to [their] special meaning,” and other words and phrases according to their “¿ommon and approved usage.” Id.; MinmStat. § 645.08(1) (2014). Further, we interpret the statute as a whole, considering the provision at issue “in light of the surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations.” Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn.2000). Indeed, we must construe a statute “to give effect to all of its provisions.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2014). When interpreting a statute, our first step is to “examine the statutory language to determine whether the words of the law are clear and free from all ambiguity.” Staab, 813 N.W.2d at 72. When the language of a statute is clear, wé apply the plain language of the statute and decline to explore its’spirit or purpose. In re Welfare of J.J.P., 831 N.W.2d at 264.

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