Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)

Citation: Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)
Parent Document: Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (2016)
Jurisdiction: Minnesota (state)
Effective Date: 2016-08-31
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4252990/mary-cocchiarella-v-donald-driggs/ ↗

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A physical occupancy requirement is also in conflict with the definition of “residential building.” Minn.Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 11. Specifically, a “residential building” includes “(1) a building used in whole or in part as -a dwelling” as well as “(2) an unoccupied building which was previously used in whole or in part as a .dwelling and which constitutes a nuisance- under section 561.01.” Id. (ertiphásis added). A “residential tenant” within- the meaning of subdivision 11(2) therefore includes a “person *628who is occupying a dwelling in [a building that is unoccupied due to a nuisance].” Id., subds. 11, 12 (emphasis added). The only way an individual can contemporaneously “occupy” an “unoccupied” building is if “occupy” in the- former sense denotes legal occupancy of the premises and in the latter sense denotes the absence of physical occupancy due to conditions constituting a nuisance. Thus, the most natural and reasonable meaning of “is occupying” in the context of a landlord-tenant relationship incorporates not- only physical occupancy, but also the present legal right of occupancy under a lease.5

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