funds in a separate account, and would return them if they are still in the escrow account when
Shearman sells her shares allocated to the cooperative apartment. Collectively, [*3]this evidences that the escrow account is a security deposit.
Civil Court does not have jurisdiction over security deposits. Courts have found under
RPAPL 711 (2) that "[s]ecurity deposits are not rent, and they cannot be recovered in a
nonpayment proceeding." (225 Holding Co., LLC v Beal, 2006 NY Slip Op 51269[U],
*1, 2006 WL 1843973, at *1, 2006 NY Misc. LEXIS 1724, at *1 [App Term 2d Dept 9th & 10th
Jud Dists, June 28, 2006, mem] [citation omitted]; accord Park Holding Co. v Johnson,
106 Misc 2d 834, 837 [Hous Part, Civ Ct, NY County 1980].) Secondary sources also consider a
security deposit not to be rent: "Since the proceeds are not rent,' they may not be recovered by
way of a nonpayment proceeding." (Finkelstein and Ferrara, supra, § 7:4, at 7:5.) The
escrow funds are not additional rent despite the litigants' agreement to the contrary.
Litigants may not confer jurisdiction on the court to rule on an escrow account simply by
calling the funds "additional rent." Despite Dolan's writing in Rasch's New York Landlord
and Tenant Practice in New York that "rent will not be deemed to include any other
payments which the tenant has covenanted to make, unless the parties expressly provide that such
other payments shall constitute rent" (1 Robert F. Dolan, Rasch's Landlord and Tenant — Summary Proceedings § 12:3, at 524-526 [4th ed 1998]), the Second Department has
ruled to the contrary. The Court in Ross
Realty v V & A Fabricators, Inc. (42 AD3d 246, 250 [2d Dept 2007]), found that
"accelerated rent" is not "rent due" and is therefore outside the jurisdiction of Civil Court, a