attorney fee award. The Ridgways appear to be the prevailing party under the small
claims statute because they offered more in settlement than the Lewises recovered
at arbitration and at the trial de novo. RCW 4.84.250, .270. Likewise, the Ridgways
appear to be the prevailing party under the arbitration statute because the Lewises
did not improve their position at the trial de novo in light of their ineffective trial de
novo request. RCW 7.06.060(1); SCCAR 7.3; see also Wiley, 143 Wn.2d at 348 (a
party fails to improve their position at the trial de novo for the purposes of SCCAR
7.3 where they do not comply with the requirements of SCCAR 7.1).
On the other hand, under the RLTA, it appears the Lewises are the prevailing
party because they recovered the entirety of their security deposit. RCW 59.18.280.
Neither the Court of Appeals nor the trial court disturbed the Lewises’ full recovery
of their deposit. Yet, without explanation, neither court entertained the Lewises’
claim that they were entitled to attorney fees under the RLTA. Instead, the lower
courts simply applied the small claims and the arbitration fee statutes, apparently to
the exclusion of the RLTA’s fee provision.
23
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
Crossroads Management, LLC v. Ridgway et al., No. 101329-9
Resolving the dispute over attorney fees and costs goes beyond the scope of
this court’s opinion and will require additional proceedings on remand. The
apparent tension among the various statutes was noted by the Court of Appeals in
Housing Authority of City of Everett v. Kirby, 154 Wn. App. 842, 226 P.3d 222
(2010), abrogated on other grounds by Hous. Auth. v. Bin, 163 Wn. App. 367, 260
P.3d 900 (2011). There, the court observed: