Wn.2d at 815 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Perkins Coie v. Williams, 84 Wn. App.
733, 737, 929 P.2d 1215 (1997)). Adopting the Zimmerman approach would open
the door to piecemeal appeals, lengthen the arbitration process, and undermine the
purpose of the arbitration statute. Malted Mousse, 150 Wn.2d at 530 (rejecting
piecemeal appeal of an arbitration award is “in harmony with the plain language of
RCW 7.06.050 and MAR 7.1-7.2”). Accordingly, we disapprove of the distinction
created in Zimmerman and reaffirm that the sole means to appeal from an adverse
arbitration award is through the trial de novo process.
In reaffirming this rule, it is important to state the limits of our holding. We
do not suggest that a party cannot move to vacate a judgment on an arbitration award
if they otherwise meet the CR 60 criteria. SCCAR 6.3 provides that a final judgment
on the arbitration award may be “set aside . . . by a motion to vacate under CR 60.”
The Court of Appeals has appropriately recognized the limited circumstances in
which parties may bring CR 60 motions, holding they may “‘only be brought on the
grounds of a defect inherent in the judgment itself or in the means (i.e., the court
proceedings) by which it was obtained.’” Pybas, 73 Wn. App. at 398-99 (excusable
neglect is not grounds to vacate a judgment on an arbitration award) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting ML Park Place Corp. v. Hedreen, 71 Wn. App.
727, 743, 862 P.2d 602 (1993)); Dill, 152 Wn. App. at 821-22 (trial de novo is sole
means to appeal from an adverse arbitration award and a CR 60 motion cannot
19
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Crossroads Management, LLC v. Ridgway et al., No. 101329-9