the party’s position on the trial de novo.”). It also permits a party to recover attorney
fees under the small claims statute “even though at the trial de novo the appealing
party may have improved his or her position from the arbitration.”
RCW 7.06.060(3). These rules are designed to discourage meritless actions and
appeals. Wiley, 143 Wn.2d at 348.
The RLTA’s fee award statute for security deposit disputes, RCW 59.18.280,
authorizes an award of attorney fees and costs to a tenant who prevails “[i]n any
action brought by the tenant to recover the deposit.” (Emphasis added.) Though the
statute does not directly define “prevailing party,” its context suggests a tenant
prevails by recovering their deposit in whole or in part. See Campbell & Gwinn,
LLC, 146 Wn.2d at 11-12 (we derive the plain meaning of a statute through its
context); see also Goodeill v. Madison Real Est., 191 Wn. App. 88, 102-03, 362 P.3d
302 (2015) (tenant awarded attorney fees and costs after recovering full security
deposit on appeal). Interpreting the fee provision in this manner aligns with the
purpose of the RLTA, which is to create “remedies for tenants in order ‘to protect
several tenant interests susceptible to the landlord’s upper hand.’” Silver v. Rudeen
22
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
Crossroads Management, LLC v. Ridgway et al., No. 101329-9
Mgmt. Co., Inc., 197 Wn.2d 535, 548, 484 P.3d 1251 (2021) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Thomas Bothwell, Comment, Washington Tenant
Remedies and the Consumer Protection Act, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 559, 599 (1975)).
Against this backdrop, it appears the lower courts failed to fully address the
question of who should be considered the prevailing party for purposes of any