Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 1013299.pdf

Citation: Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 1013299.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1013299.pdf ↗

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Crossroads Management, LLC v. Ridgway et al., No. 101329-9

Hanson, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 463 (declining to excuse noncompliance with SCCAR

7.1 on the grounds that appellant “relied on an outdated court rule and used an

outdated form”). Accepting the Lewises’ “narrow exception” would require us to

disapprove of this consistent body of precedent.

Moreover, the mandatory signature requirement at issue here is prescribed in

statute, and the Lewises provide no authority for courts to waive the statutory

requirements for appealing from an arbitration award. Permitting trial courts to

make case-by-case exceptions to the statutory arbitration appeal requirements based

on practical challenges posed by COVID-19 would risk destabilizing the entire

statutory scheme insofar as it would suggest courts have expansive judicial authority

to excuse compliance with any statutory requirement.

In sum, the trial court erred in finding the Lewises needed to only substantially

comply with SCCAR 7.1(a) because “[n]oncompliance is not substantial

compliance.” Mangan v. Lamar, 18 Wn. App. 2d 93, 97, 496 P.3d 1213 (2021).

The trial court had no authority to waive the mandatory signature requirement. We

affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that the Lewises’ noncompliance with

SCCAR 7.1 rendered their filing invalid, thereby nullifying their trial de novo.

We next address whether, in the absence of a valid trial de novo request, the

Lewises may appeal the prearbitration order granting the Ridgways’ motion for

partial summary judgment.