replace a trial de novo). This limitation ensures that a party does not use CR 60 to
“circumvent the time constraints of other rules.” Pybas, 73 Wn. App. at 398.
Nor do we suggest that a party cannot move for discretionary review of a
prearbitration summary judgment order to avoid an unnecessary arbitration of fewer
than all claims. See RAP 2.3; Zimmerman, 160 Wn. App. at 692 n.9 (“discretionary
review of the partial summary judgment order would have been a better use of
judicial resources”). Indeed, the Lewises moved for discretionary review of the
partial summary judgment order, but the Court of Appeals denied the motion. They
did not seek further discretionary review of that decision in this court, as was their
right.
In sum, we affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that the Lewises failed to
properly request a trial de novo and that their appeal from the order granting partial
summary judgment was therefore ineffective. Our case law demands strict
compliance with the arbitration statutes and rules, which required the Lewises to
personally sign their trial de novo request. We take this opportunity to disapprove
of Zimmerman to the extent that that opinion recognized an exception for certain
orders granting summary judgment. Because the sole means to appeal from an
adverse arbitration award is a trial de novo, we do not reach the merits of the
Lewises’ attempted appeal of the adverse summary judgment order.
20
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Crossroads Management, LLC v. Ridgway et al., No. 101329-9
ATTORNEY FEES
Finally, we turn to the question of who is entitled to attorney fees and costs.
Under the various fee-shifting statutes at play in this case, the prevailing party is