Section 1942
- Citation
- Section 1942
- Parent Document
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Jurisdiction
- California (state)
- Effective Date
- 2003-08-11
Other Sections in This Document (188)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
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Full Text
1,002 charsContrary to the majority's holding, the Court of Appeal in Cervantes made clear that a landlord who was acting for a retaliatory purpose was not acting in good faith: "Proof of a valid ground may undermine evidence of a retaliatory motive. But proof of a valid ground is not equivalent to proof of good faith. In a given instance, a valid ground might exist but the landlord might nevertheless act with a retaliatory motive. A property tax increase of five dollars does not necessarily justify an increase in rent of one hundred dollars. Therefore, under subdivision (a) of the statute, a trier of fact confronted with substantial evidence of a valid ground nevertheless had to decide whether the landlord's 'dominant purpose' was retaliation." (Western Land Office, Inc. v. Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d 724, 734, 220 Cal. Rptr. 784.)[3] In my view, therefore, a landlord who is acting for a retaliatory purpose is not acting in "good faith" within the meaning of subdivision (e) of section 1942.5.