Section 1942
- Citation
- Section 1942
- Parent Document
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Jurisdiction
- California (state)
- Effective Date
- 2003-08-11
Other Sections in This Document (188)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
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Full Text
1,242 charsFolsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments, supra, 32 Cal.3d 668, 681-682, concluded that legislative history showing that the word “private” had been included in the original version of a bill, deleted by the Assembly, and then reinserted by the Senate was “at best equivocal.” By contrast, the committee analysis relied upon by tenants in the present case could hardly be more clear. It demonstrates that the Legislature specifically contemplated that the Ellis Act would not allow a landlord to go out of business for a retaliatory purpose. The use of the words “probably” and “could” do not affect this conclusion. Those words acknowledge that a notice to quit under the Ellis Act that followed a tenant’s report of housing code violations “would probably” or “could” be deemed retaliatory, but would not necessarily be deemed so. The committee analysis is clear and unequivocal, however, that a “retaliatory eviction,” if established, would be “prohibited.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 505 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 10, 1985, p. 3.) This is compelling evidence that the Legislature did not intend the Ellis Act to empower a landlord to evict a tenant for a retaliatory purpose.