Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Citation
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Parent Document
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Jurisdiction
- California (state)
- Effective Date
- 2003-08-11
Other Sections in This Document (188)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Drouet v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003)
- Section 1942
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Full Text
1,005 charsWe find that the Ellis Act qualifies as a “law pertaining to the hiring of property” under section 1942.5, subdivision (d), and that a landlord’s withdrawal of the property from the market is an exercise of “ ‘the right to go out of the rental business’ ” (First Presbyterian Church v. City of Berkeley (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1253 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 710]) under that law. We further conclude, in accordance with subdivisions (d) and (e) of section 1942.5, that a landlord’s bona fide intent to withdraw the property from the rental market under the Ellis Act will defeat the statutory defense of retaliatory eviction. Because the trial court did not consider the landlord’s motion for summary adjudication under this standard, we reverse the Court of Appeal, which had issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to grant the landlord’s motion for summary adjudication, with directions to remand the matter to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. BACKGROUND