Moreover, Loretto itself confirmed the age-old distinction between regulation and public use.14 Writing for the Court, *302Justice Marshall approved the state government’s “broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship in particular without paying compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation entails.” 458 U.S. at 440, 102 S.Ct. at 3179. The Court’s citations in support of this longstanding proposition include Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 42 S.Ct. 289, 66 L.Ed. 595 (1922), and Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 458, 65 L.Ed. 865 (1921). Levy upheld a New York statute similar to the Anti-Eviction Act and the Tenancy Act, placing limits on the landlord’s right of action to recover possession from holdover tenants. In Block, the Court upheld a District of Columbia ordinance that gave tenants a right of continued occupation following the expiration of their leases. The Court clearly assumed that the creation of the statutory tenancy for private parties was not a taking for public use.15 Statutory tenancy laws protecting holdover tenants are not takings, but merely regulations of the use to which private property may be put. Such regulations of the use of private property frequently involve costs to the owner. They are nevertheless not deemed to be takings. E.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-94, 82 S.Ct. 987, 989-90, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-97, 47 S.Ct. 114, 117-21, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926) (industrial zoning); see note 16 infra. See also Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 61-76 (1964) (terming the distinction one between government as “enterpriser” and government as “mediator”).