Section 14

Citation: Section 14
Parent Document: Troy Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287 (1984)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 1984-01-30
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/8929297/troy-ltd-v-renna/ ↗

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In Loretto, the Supreme Court held that a “permanent physical occupation of property is a taking.” 458 U.S. at 441, 102 S.Ct. at 3179. The Tenancy Act is clearly not a taking of property under the Loretto standard of permanency. Most tenants with a protected status will be 70 years of age (or, if surviving spouses, 58 years of age) before the Tenancy Act comes into play. It is fanciful to imagine that these tenants will occupy their units “permanently.” Moreover, the tenancies may terminate by virtue of changing income levels or principal residences, and tenants may be evicted on any of thirteen grounds. See note 1 supra. Finally, the Loretto Court itself distinguished state housing legislation authorizing an extension of the tenant’s lease. 458 U.S. at 440, 102 S.Ct. at 3178, citing Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 246-48, 42 S.Ct. 289, 291-92, 66 L.Ed. 595 (1922), and Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153-58, 41 S.Ct. 458, 459-60, 65 L.Ed. 865 (1921). “In none of these cases,” the Court held, “did the government authorize the permanent occupation of the landlord’s property by a third party.” Id. Under these circumstances, the Tenancy Act obviously does not fall within the proscription of Loretto.

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