Section 1639

Citation: Section 1639
Parent Document: Tippett v. Daly, 10 A.3d 1123 (2010)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2010-12-30
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2551230/tippett-v-daly/ ↗

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The court concedes, as it must, that because TOPA uses the word "provide" in connection with the tenant's expression of interest to purchase the property, the statute is not clear on its face as to whether the tenant must ensure receipt or simply send the expression of interest within the thirty-day period that the statute prescribes. See ante at 1130 ("To be sure, our task would have been simpler if the Council had used the word `deliver' instead of `provide' ..."). The court, therefore, is forced to choose among dictionary sub-meanings of the word "provide" (e.g., "furnish" rather than "submit") and draw analogies to other parts of the statute (and even different statutory schemes) to conclude that when the statute says the "tenant *1136 shall ... provide" an expression of interest to purchase within thirty days, it meant to require that the "owner must receive" the notice within the thirty-day period. As I pointed out in my dissent from the division opinion, however, the TOPA statute uses the word "receipt" advisedly in several provisions. Tippett v. Daly, 964 A.2d 606, 615 (D.C.2009) (Ruiz, J., dissenting). Indeed, the word "receipt" is used twice in the very section at issue in this case, D.C.Code § 42-3404.09(1) ("Upon receipt of a written offer of sale from the owner ..., or upon the Mayor's receipt of a copy of the written offer of sale, whichever is later, the tenant shall have thirty days to provide ...."). We must assume that if it had intended to require receipt by the owner before the end date of the thirty-day period, the Council would similarly have used the word "receipt" as it did, in the same statutory section, in identifying "receipt" by the tenant of the owner's offer of sale as the starting date for the thirty-day period to respond.[1] It did not; instead, it chose to use "provide." The Council's use of "provide" either is purposeful in imposing a less stringent obligation on tenants than on owners, or, at a minimum, is ambiguous.

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