Section 1639

Citation: Section 1639
Parent Document: Tippett v. Daly, 10 A.3d 1123 (2010)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2010-12-30
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2551230/tippett-v-daly/ ↗

Full Text

2,313 chars

In light of the clarifying amendment, the majority recognizes that its opinion is unlikely to have any impact beyond precluding the right to purchase of the appellant in this case. That would have been reason enough to reconsider the wisdom of according en banc imprimatur to the division’s split opinion. Beyond the particular statutory provision (and litigant) in this case, however, there is other mischief the full court’s opinion could visit on future cases that require interpretation of TOPA or other statutes that contain a similar rule of statutory construction. See, e.g., D.C.Code § 42 — 1903.02(f) (stating that the section authorizing condominium declarant control “shall be strictly construed to protect the rights of the unit owners”). What is at the core of my dissent is the proper role of the court vis a, vis the legislature— whether it be the Council of the District of Columbia or the Congress of the United States — when it comes to interpreting a statute. Our role as judges is to effectuate legislative will. Without a doubt there are cases when courts must fill in blanks or choose between alternative interpretations when confronted with ambiguous or inadequate statutory language, whether the ambiguities and inadequacies are inadvertent or the result of legislators’ inability or unwillingness to see eye-to-eye. Courts faced with such a task must do the best they can with the interpretive tools available to them, with the knowledge that their interpretation can be overridden if the legislature considers that the court got it wrong. But this is not one of those difficult cases. Where the legislature has spoken clearly in a matter within its competence, there is no need for judges to use proxies for legislative will. In this case, the legislature enacted a provision in TOPA telling the court that when a choice is to be made, it must tilt in favor of tenants. Moreover, when a division of the court failed to do so, the legislature told the court in no uncertain terms that it got it wrong in the division opinion, passed a Resolution, and consecutive emergency, temporary and, most recently, permanent legislation to correct it. Yet the full court persists in its contrary view of what the statute means. Due regard for the legislature’s express intent compels me to dissent.5

Other Sections in This Document (168)

Full Text