Section 1639

Citation: Section 1639
Parent Document: Tippett v. Daly, 10 A.3d 1123 (2010)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2010-12-30
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2551230/tippett-v-daly/ ↗

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The mandate to resolve any ambiguity in favor of the tenant requires us to interpret “provide” to mean “send,” and not, as the court does, to require that the tenant “deliver” or ensure receipt by the owner. It should be obvious that it is beneficial to tenants to have more time, not less, to consider and respond to an offer of sale. The court’s attempt to persuade that its interpretation “could benefit tenants as well as owners,” ante at 1134, is belied by the arguments made to the court: both the tenant in this appeal and the Chief Tenant Advocate of the District of Columbia Office of the Tenant Advocate (who urged the court to rehear the case en banc in order to reverse the division’s interpretation that the full court now affirms) disagree that the court’s interpretation redounds to the benefit of tenants.2 Moreover, the court is *1137simply wrong when it says that interpreting the word “provide” to require receipt by the owner (rather than mailing by the tenant) will benefit tenants because other sections of the statute, §§ 42-3404.03(4) and -3404.09(2), also use the word “provide” when imposing an obligation on owners to make certain information concerning the offer and the housing accommodation available to tenants. See ante at 1132-33. What the court ignores in making that assertion is that, as already discussed, TOPA expressly states that the tenant’s thirty-day period to respond begins “upon receipt” by the tenant of the offer of sale. D.C.Code § 42-3404.09(1). TOPA also provides that once the tenant expresses interest in purchasing and the “reasonable period to negotiate” is commenced, a day is added to the negotiation period for every day that the owner delays in “providing” requested information. See § 42-3404.09(2). The TOPA statute, in other words, in its design leans in favor of preserving the tenant’s right to purchase, by ensuring that the time periods allowed to the tenant for responding to an offer of sale and subsequent negotiation are not infringed by the owner’s delay. Instead, the court is interpreting the statute in the manner which it thinks will result in the most efficient procedure. See ante at 1132-33. Even if the court’s scheme is a better one, however, it is not our job as judges to “fix” what we think is faulty legislation, but to interpret the statute that was enacted and implement it so as to effectuate legislative intent.3

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