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INTERNAL PROTOTYPE — NOT LEGAL ADVICE — DO NOT SEND

Section 70-24-202

Citation
Section 70-24-202
Parent Document
Summers v. Crestview Apartments, 2010 MT 164 (2010)
Jurisdiction
Montana (state)
Effective Date
2010-07-27

Other Sections in This Document (530)

Full Text

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¶56 More troubling is the Court’s willingness to predetermine that, as a matter of law, acceleration clauses in residential agreements are unenforceable. Opinion, ¶ 27 (“[[Irrespective of a factual determination by the District Court that Crestview acted reasonably to mitigate damages, as a matter of law an accelerated rent provision in a lease agreement conflicts with the landlord’s duty to mitigate damages under § 70-24-401(1), MCA.”) The Commission Comments to § 70-24-404, MCA, provide that “the particular facts involved in each case are of utmost importance since unconscionability may exist in some situations but not in others.” (Emphasis added.) At the very least, the Court should refrain from adopting a bright-line rule which declares all acceleration clauses, regardless of the circumstances, are ipso facto unconscionable. Instead, as recommended by the Comments, we should judge the “particular facts” of each case. See also Pierce v. Emigrant Mortgage Co., 463 F. Supp. 2d 221, 225 (D. Conn. 2006); Pelphrey v. Cobb Co., 547 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008); Dolphin & Bradbury, Inc. v. SEC, 512 F.3d 634, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2008); U.S. v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1135 (8th Cir. 1998).