Section 70-24-202

Citation: Section 70-24-202
Parent Document: Summers v. Crestview Apartments, 2010 MT 164 (2010)
Jurisdiction: Montana (state)
Effective Date: 2010-07-27
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/889353/summers-v-crestview-apartments/ ↗

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¶55 However, according to the record, Summers had a meaningful choice as to the rental agreement and accompanying acceleration clause. The District Court recognized that “[t]he residential rental market in Missoula is large and [Summers] had hundreds of alternatives to contracting with [Crestview].” (Emphasis added.) Summers not only fails to dispute the District Court’s statement, but admitted during oral argument that the rental agreement at issue is “unique to Crestview” and that other rental options were readily available. Summers had the clear opportunity to seek residency elsewhere under a different agreement. Summers thus had a meaningful choice. See Chor v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 261 Mont. 143, 149-50, 862 P.2d 26, 30-31 (1993); Hardin v. Morningside of Jackson, L.L.C., 425 F. Supp. 2d 898, 904-06 (W.D. Tenn. 2006); Parada v. Superior Ct., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 743, 758 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. *1402009); Black v. Of Kitchen Things II, Inc., 467 N.Y.S.2d 167, 169 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983). I would conclude that the acceleration clause was valid and was not prohibited under § 70-24-404, MCA.

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